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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of minimum wage on employment rates of young
individuals taking into account potential nonlinearity, as predicted by a search and matching
model. We find a significant nonlinear relationship between the minimum wage and employment.
Negative effect of the minimum wages on employment is stronger if the labor markets are otherwise
strictly regulated and when workers are relatively unproductive.
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1. Introduction
Currently, about 90 percent of countries worldwide have statutory minimum wages in place
(see Herr and Kazandziska 2011). As such, the effects of minimum wages on employment are not
only theoretically but also empirically one of the most vividly discussed topics in today’s labor
market policies.
The aim of this paper is to estimate the effects of changes in the minimum wage on the
employment rate of young individuals in a selection of European countries. Recent theoretical
research on the effects of minimum wages on employment suggests that the effect might in fact be
non-linear. In this work, we make a first attempt to test this theoretical prediction.
Theoretical research by Brown et al. (2014) serves as a baseline model for our predictions. The
authors show that higher wages depress the “job offer rate.” On the other hand, higher wages
increase the “job acceptance rate,” since the value of work relative to unemployment increases.
Therefore the authors argue: “Under moderate minimum wages, the latter effect may dominate
the former.” It is exactly this possibility of a nonlinear relationship that we are interested in.
Keeping this theoretical approach in mind, we estimate whether the employment effects of an
increase in the minimum wage might in fact be nonlinear: lower wages could stimulate employment,
whereas once the wage is set too high the effect is reversed. Anticipating the main results, we
show that low minimum wages might induce employment for young and older workers, yet once
the minimum wages are set at higher levels, the employment possibilities are indeed reduced.
Micro-data analysis of the effects of minimum wages on employment is vast. Neumark and
Wascher (2006) give a broad overview of minimum wage studies which estimate the employment
effects. However, even though a number of studies focus on cross-country time-series analysis of
the employment effects of different labor market policies, there are comparatively few works that
focus on the effect of minimum wage.
The OECD (1998) analyzes minimum wage effects on employment of three specific groups:
teenagers, young adults, and prime-age adults. The authors use a panel of nine OECD countries
between 1975 and 1996. The regression model follows the state-panel models used in the US
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minimum wage literature (see e.g. Burkhauser et al. 2000, Keil et al. 2001, Partridge and Partridge
1999). The results show that an increase in the minimum wage has a negative employment effect
for the teenager group in all specified models. For the other age groups the effects are ambiguous.
Another study comes from Neumark and Wascher (2004) and combines the methodology of
the OECD study with some additional data on different labor market institutions and policies
that might influence the employment rates and a panel that includes 17 countries from 1976 until
2000. For all specifications the results for teenagers as well as for the youth suggest a negative
employment effect of an increase in the minimum wage. Additionally, Neumark and Wascher
(2004) estimate the effects of bargaining and subminima for young employees. While bargained
minimum wages and youth subminima lead to a weaker negative employment effect of a minimum
wage increase for teenagers and youths, industry and geographic wage floors seem to strengthen
the negative effects.
Addison and Ozturk (2010) use a panel of 16 OECD countries and look at the period between
1970 and 2008. They estimate the employment effects of a minimum wage increase not on teenagers
and young adults but on female prime-age workers. The results are in line with the findings of
Neumark and Wascher (2004), suggesting a negative employment effect on prime-age females.
Regarding the stronger dis-employment effects in countries with the least regulated labor markets,
they did not find empirical evidence for the target group.
Dolton and Bondibene (2011) re-estimate the results of Neumark and Wascher (2004) by using
panel data for 33 OECD countries from 1976 to 2008. The model they use is similar to the
model of Neumark and Wascher (2004) except for additional controlling for the aggregated labor
market situation. Their results are in line with the findings of Neumark and Wascher (2004),
suggesting a negative employment effect of changes in the minimum wage. As a robustness test,
the authors suggest using a weighted regression technique, to control for different sizes of the
countries’ labor markets. When the authors used this estimation technique, they found neither
a significant negative nor a significant positive employment effect of a minimum wage increase.
Most recently, for the European Union, Laporsˇek (2013) finds a negative effect of minimum wages
on youth employment.
While most empirical research was based on a linear employment effect of a minimum wage
increase within countries that might differ in institutional labor market settings and for the low-
skilled and/or young workers, our analysis contributes to the discussion in several ways. Firstly,
we directly estimate whether the theoretically-predicted nonlinear effects of minimum wages find
evidence for the case of European countries. Explicit analysis of a nonlinear relationship can
explain some of the insignificant results present in the previous works. Secondly, we carefully
approach and correct for potential endogeneity of the covariates, which in many studies has not
been accounted for. Finally, we estimate employment elasticities on a country–by–country basis,
which allows us to formulate careful policy recommendations.
This paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we briefly present the theoretical model and
hypotheses for the empirical study. Section 3 presents the empirical model as well as the data.
Afterwards, the empirical findings and robustness analysis will be discussed in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2. Theoretical background and hypotheses
Before we formulate our hypotheses, it is useful to explain in more detail the hypotheses
stemming from the theoretical work of Brown et al. (2014). In this model, firms only offer a job
if the idiosyncratic variations in workers’ suitability for the jobs are sufficiently low. As a result,
since the job offer rate in the steady state negatively depends on the equilibrium wage, an increase
in the minimum wage will reduce the “job offer rate” and lead to lower employment. This effect
is called the “job offer effect” and can be summarized by the formula
η = Jε
(
a− w
1− δ(1− σ) − h
)
, (1)
where Jε denotes the cumulative distribution of the job suitability shock, a is the average workers’
productivity, w is the equilibrium wage, δ is the time discount factor, h are the hiring costs, and
σ is the separation rate. It is easy to see that the job offer effect should positively depend on the
average workers’ productivity, and negatively on the wage level as well as hiring costs.
On the other hand, some workers are willing to work for the new (higher) equilibrium wage
because it is now above their reservation wages - the job acceptance rate increases. This leads to
higher employment and is called the “job acceptance effect” and is given by
α = Je
(
w − b
1− δ(1− σ − µ)
)
, (2)
where Je is the cumulative distribution of the work effort disutility shock and b stands for the
unemployment benefit level. Job acceptance clearly positively depends on the wage level and
negatively on the level of unemployment benefits b.
The theoretical predictions of Brown et al. (2014) allow us to formulate hypotheses on the signs
of the effects of particular labor market institutions on employment. As the job acceptance effect
might dominate the job offer effect for lower wages, and the opposite might be true for the case
of high minimum wages, we expect the relationship between the level of the minimum wage and
the employment rates to have an inverted–U shape. Additional inspection of (1) and (2) allows us
to form hypotheses on the signs of the other labor market characteristics on employment as well
as on the interactions between the hiring costs, unemployment benefits, and productivity of the
workers and the minimum wage. We expect the hiring costs as well as the unemployment benefits
to decrease the overall employment levels, whereas the productivity of the workers is expected to
increase employment.
Additionally, the hiring costs, unemployment benefits, and the average productivity change the
strength of the two countervailing effects. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the average productivity
of the workers strengthens the job offer effect and, subsequently, the point at which the minimum
wage effect turns negative should shift to the right. Similarly, both the hiring costs (which reduce
the job offers) and the unemployment benefits (which reduce the job acceptance) should shift
the turning point to the left, towards lower minimum wages. The summary of the predictions is
presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: Predicted effects
Variable Sign/Effect
Minimum Wage Inverted U
Hiring Costs Negative
Productivity Positive
Unemployment benefits Negative
Hiring Costs * Minimum Wage Negative (Shift left)
Productivity * Minimum Wage Positive (Shift right)
Unemployment Benefits * Minimum Wage Negative (Shift left)
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3. Data and the empirical model
3.1. Data
Our panel contains data on 12 EU countries with statutory minimum wages3 over the period
1980-2011. To capture the changes in the minimum wage we first employ the real annual minimum
wages (RAMW ) adjusted for purchasing power parity. As additional measure for minimum wage
we use the Kaitz index (MWAW ) that reflects the relationship between the level of the minimum
wage and the average wage and can be interpreted as the relative price of low–skilled and average–
skilled labor. We do not include the countries with strict collective bargaining systems for different
economic sectors (e.g. Italy or Austria) as for these the Kaitz index is not available and might
additionally bias the estimates. The summary statistics of the annual minimum wage and the
Kaitz index are presented in Table 9 in the Appendix.
The main source of the data is the OECD database. The labor force data, including average
worker productivity and replacement rates, were taken from the OECD Annual Labour Force
Statistic, while the real annual minimum wage and Kaitz index is taken from the OECD Minimum
Wage Database4. Labor market regulation data come from the Economic Freedom of the World
(EFW) database by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney et al. 2014), and macroeconomic indicators
are taken from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. Additionally secondary school
enrollment (United Nations), conscription (EFW), recesssion (WEO), collective bargaining (World
Economic Forum) and annual average wages (OECD) are used as control variables. Our sample
is an unbalanced panel including 228 observations. The source for the unbalanced panel arises
from different implementation times of the statutory minimum wage and only partially from the
availability of the data. Hence, this selectivity should not bias the estimates.5 Main variables used
in the regressions are summarized in Tables 10 and 11 in the Appendix.
3The countries covered in our sample are Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and the United Kingdom.
4The original OECD series does not consider the fact that France has introduced a 35-hour workweek in 2000.
We have readjusted the whole series to this change.
5The start of our time series for the Kaitz index is highlighted in Table 9.
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3.2. The empirical model
The theoretical predictions suggest that the relationship between the minimum wage level and
the employment rates might have an inverted–U shape. The baseline model is, therefore
Empi,t = α+ β ∗MWi,t−1 + γ ∗MW 2i,t−1 + δ ∗Hi,t + ζ ∗AWPi,t+
η ∗GRRi,t + Θ ∗Xi,t + τt + αi + εi,t, (3)
where Empi,t is the employment rate at time t in country i, and MWi,t−1 is the lagged minimum
wage variable at time t− 1 in country i proxied by first by Kaitz index (MWAW ) and second by
real annual statutory minimum wage (RAMW ). Hi,t stands for the hiring costs measured by the
strictness of labor market regulations (EFW 5B index)6, AWP is the average labor productivity
measured as GDP per hour worked in country i at time t (at constant prices), GRR is the gross
replacement rate measuring the relative size of the unemployment benefits to the wage levels, and
X is a vector of the control variables. EmpMidi,t is the control variable for the overall labor market
situation, namely the employment rate of the prime-age workers at time t for country i, PRYi,t is
the size of the young cohort (aged between 15 and 24 years) to the working-age population (aged
between 15 and 64 years). Additionally we control for secondary school enrollment (SchEn), the
strength of collective wage bargaining (Bargaining) and the strength of conscription regulations
(Conscription) and we include a recession dummy (periods with negative growth of real GDP)7.
Finally, τt stands for the time effects and αi are country-specific fixed effects. Alternatively, instead
of time effects, we allow for country–specific trends.
The effects of a minimum wage, from a theoretical perspective, should take place after a delay,
since it takes time for employers to adjust the factor inputs (low-skilled labor, high-skilled labor,
and capital) to a change in the factor prices (see Neumark and Wascher 1992, Baker et al. 1999).
Additionally, the high level of employment protection in Europe would suggest to use the lag the
minimum wage variable, since as argued by Neumark and Wascher (2004): “One might think that
this adjustment process would be even slower in European countries, where legal restrictions on
dismissals are generally stricter then in the United States.” The lagged specification additionally
resolves to some extent the problem of potential endogeneity of the MW variable, which will be
addressed in full further on.
In order to further explore the size and strength of the effect of minimum wages on employment,
we additionally add interaction terms with the three other main variables, which as explained in
the previous section determine the job offer and job acceptance effects: the average productivity
of workers, hiring costs, and the size of unemployment benefits. We then analyze the signs and
the strength of the marginal effects of the minimum wages for different levels of other variables of
interest.
One of the concerns in our specification is that the employment rate of prime-age workers and
employment rate of the young cohort are jointly determined by unobserved factors which determine
the overall macroeconomic condition of a country. To avoid endogeneity bias stemming from this
fact, we do not include the employment rate of prime-age workers directly, but instrument it in the
first stage regressions with other macroeconomic indicators. On a basis of strong and significant
correlations we use the second lag of the output gap as well as lags of the employment rate of
prime age workers itself. Additionally, we reassess all results instrumenting for the employment
rate with oil shock exposure in the previous period, as suggested by Raphael and Winter-Ebmer
(2001), who find that fluctuations in oil prices have strong effects on employment rates. Exposure
to the oil shock is measured as a lagged difference between the Brent crude import oil prices
for each country, i.e. for period t this variable is defined as pricet−1 − pricet−2. Correlations
between the employment rate of prime age workers, the output gap, and the exposure variable
6We have rescaled the index so that higher value denotes more regulation. Moreover, early observations in the
Fraser index are of poor quality, due to lacking data; we have recalculated the index to account for the missing
components.
7Variables AWP , H, GRR and control variables Bargaining and Conscription have all been Varimax rotated,
thus rescaled with mean equal 0 and variance equal 1.
6
are presented in Table 2. We can observe that oil shock exposure is positively correlated with
both the employment rate and the output gap. This instrument might be a weaker measure of
macroeconomic conditions, nevertheless its biggest advantange is a high degree of exogeneity. In
all IV regressions, we use the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood estimator (LIML), which
performs better when the instruments are weak.8
Table 2: Cross-correlations of the instruments (Significance at 0.01 level)
Variables EmpMid Output gap
Output Gap -0.32*
Oil shock -0.29* 0.25*
As mentioned above, one of the main concerns in any analysis of the impact of the minimum
wages on the employment levels is potential endogeneity of the main independent variable: min-
imum wage itself might be endogenous with respect to the employment levels, as labor market
policies might be introduced specifically to answer the changes in the labor market conditions. As
argued by Lemos (2005), politicians might favor or oppose minimum wage increases depending on
the overall macroeconomic performance in a country. Yet, irrespective of the reaction of the politi-
cians to the macroeconomic circumstances, changes in the minimum wages can be explained by
the ideology of the politicians in power. Arguably, higher minimum wages are introduced by left–
wing governments irrespective of the economic condition of a country. We base our identification
strategy on this latter observation (see e.g. Saint-Paul 1996).
In the second set of regressions, we make use of the above observation, and instrument the
minimum wage with the political orientation of the government. Data on the political orientation
of cabinets are provided by the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al. 2012) and include
information on relative power position of social democratic and other left parties in government
based on their seat share in parliament, measured as a percentage of the total parliamentary seat
share of all governing parties and weighted by the number of days in office in a given year. This
instrument will be a valid exogenous source of variation provided that the left–wing politicians
are not elected more often under deteriorating economic conditions. There is some evidence
(Whitten and Palmer 1999) that the voters punish left–wing governments for rising comparative
unemployment (comparative to the average for industrial democracies), but there is no evidence
on a similar relationship within a country. If left–wing governments are less popular in times of
high unemployment, rising unemployment might reduce the power of the left–wing parties and
in turn result in a lower probability of an increase in a minimum wage. Inclusion of the control
for the general macroeconomic performace should, however, capture this effect, and the residual
variation would in this case be exogenous. Correlations and signifance levels of all instruments are
presented in the Appendix.
Another methodological issue is that the used data is an average of specific data. This might
lead to problems in the estimation methods (see e.g. Baker et al. (1999)) because the size of
the labor markets differs across countries. Dolton and Bondibene (2011) mention that the use of
weighted regression might be a solution to this problem. The regression should be weighted by
the number of raw data points that are used to calculate the averages.9 As a robustness check we
8The preference for the LIML estimator stems from two main reasons:
1. The LIML estimator has been shown to perform better if the sample size is small, as is ours (see e.g.
Anderson et al. 1982). Various studies show that the the LIML estimator approaches the asymptotic normal
distribution much more rapidly than two–stage least squares.
2. The LIML estimator is preferred to the 2SLS estimator whenever instruments are weak and the use of the
LIML estimator potentially eliminates the usual bias associated with the use of 2SLS with weak instruments,
even if the normality of the errors is violated (see e.g. Kunitomo and Matsushita 2008).
9We weight the regressions with raw data points that are used to calculate the average (or the labor market
size), but not with the population of the country (as it is done by Dolton and Bondibene (2011)). This might not
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add, therefore, estimates of regressions weighted by the sizes of the labor markets, measured as
the number of persons aged 15 to 64 in each country.
Additionally, we show the relationship between the current minimum wage and employment
levels. We are convinced that the lagged specification corresponds better to the rigid European
labor markets, yet to analyze sensitivity of the results to this arbitrary assumption, we reassess the
result using current instead of lagged minimum wages. Finally, since the sample size is relatively
small, we need to make sure that the results are not driven by outliers. We reestimate all equations
correcting for outliers. We identify the outliers on a basis of the leverage statistic and the Cook
distance. The leverage need to be lower than 3k/N ' 0.73 and the Cook’s distance needs to be
lower than 4/N ' 0.018. We drop the obversations which do not satisfy these requirements and
reestimate the results.
be an appropriate weight, since the population size is not necessarily a good proxy for the labor market size. The
retirement age differs widely across countries and, additionally, the demographic structure in the countries is not
the same.
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4. Empirical Findings
In this section we present the main results of the effects of minimum wages on employment of
young workers. In the second subsection we additionally analyze the interaction terms with other
variables of interest. Finally, the third subsection contains the instrumental variable specifications,
the weighted regressions, and other robustness checks. Since we use not only the real annual
minimum wage, but also the Kaitz index as a dependent variable, an important first step in this
analysis involves evaluating whether the relationship between the minimum wage and average wage
is indeed positive and linear, to rule out the possibility that the non–linear effect works through
the average wage channel. Figure 1 visualizes the relationship between the annual minimum wages
and the annual average wages for all countries in the sample.10 Figure 1 as well as the country-
by-country results show a strong, positive and linear relationship between the annual minimum
wages and the annual average wages. A slighly weaker relationship can be observed only for the
case of the Netherlands, where the average wage was increasing during the whole period whereas
the minimum wage remained relatively constant. We, therefore rule out the possiblity that the
non–linear effects stem from the fact that the relationship between the minimum wage and the
average wages is non–linear.
Figure 1: Relationship between average and minimum wages.
4.1. Main findings
Tables 3 and 4 present different specifications: controlling for the time effects as well as allowing
for country–specific trends.11 The Kaitz index as a dependent variable may suffer from potential
10Relationships for individual countries are presented in Figure 8 the Appendix.
11Importance of including country–specific trends has been stressed by Addison et al. (2012), Allegretto et al.
(2011) and Dube et al. (2010), who show that including country specific trends has a big impact on the estimated
results. Although, on the other hand, Meer and West (2013) argue that controlling for trends can bias the results,
it is important to understand the sensitivity of the coefficients to including this component.
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endogeneity, since as hightighted by Card et al. (1993), high average wage is often accompanied
by high employment, which would result in a negative bias of the estimates. Despite controlling
for the general employment trends, to further rule out the possibility that the results are driven
by the denominator of the Kaitz index, we reestimate all equations taking a dependent variable
the level of the annual statutory minimum wage. We use both the Kaitz index (Columns (1) and
(2)), and the annual statutory minimum wage (Columns (3) and (4)) as a variable measuring the
minimum wage level. The elasticities are evaluated at the averages.
Table 3: Main results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY
lagMWAW 1.90∗∗ 1.69∗∗
(2.51) (2.52)
lagMWAW2 -2.38∗∗∗ -2.53∗∗∗
(-2.73) (-2.90)
lagRAMW 0.38∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗
(4.43) (2.11)
lagRAMW2 -0.12∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
(-4.67) (-3.14)
AWP -0.00 -0.02∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗
(-0.26) (-1.69) (-3.48) (-2.06)
H 0.00 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03∗
(0.50) (-1.52) (-0.29) (-1.87)
GRR -0.03∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗
(-2.67) (-3.68) (-4.35) (-1.98)
Conscription -0.00 -0.01∗ -0.00 -0.01∗
(-0.02) (-1.68) (-0.17) (-1.72)
Bargaining 0.02∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00
(2.31) (1.25) (2.70) (0.36)
SchEn -0.00 -0.00∗∗ -0.00 -0.00∗
(-0.97) (-2.00) (-0.62) (-1.65)
EmpMid 1.58∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗
(3.96) (7.33) (5.47) (11.13)
PRY 0.39 -0.36 0.68 0.08
(0.92) (-0.84) (1.62) (0.15)
Recession 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.42) (-0.49) (0.65) (-0.37)
Constant -1.22∗∗∗ -0.61∗∗ -0.96∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗∗
(-2.63) (-2.20) (-4.14) (-3.12)
FE YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES NO YES NO
Country Trend NO YES NO YES
Elasticity -0.07 -0.21 0.00 -0.15
Elasticity S.E. (0.18) (0.18) (0.12) (0.12)
Observations 228 228 228 228
K-P Wald F 23.40 81.22 28.81 86.46
Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at country level, z-
Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Tables 3 and 4 reveal a nonlinear relationship between the minimum wage and the employment
for young workers. At lower levels of the minimum wage, the level of employment rises along with
the wage level, and beyond a turning point the relation inverses and additional increases in the
minimum wages have a detrimental effect on employment levels. This result is consistent with the
theory of Brown et al. (2014). Using these estimates, we can calculate the marginal effects of a
change in the minimum wages at each value of the minimum wage. These results are visualized
in Figures 2 and 3.
Reservation wage plays an important role in the decision of a job acceptance. If the offered
wage is below the reservation wage, the person decides to stay outside the job market; if it is
above, then the person prefers to participate in the job market and accept the job offer. The
reservation wage is influenced through individual preferences (e.g. work vs. free time, financial
dependence), labor market policies (e.g. unemployment benefits, minimum wage), and outside
options (e.g. education, retirement).
Young workers are often not eligible for unemployment benefits, and are likely to tolerate
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Table 4: Main results with oil shock exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY
lagMWAW 2.57∗∗∗ 2.79∗∗∗
(2.61) (2.75)
lagMWAW2 -2.98∗∗∗ -3.77∗∗∗
(-2.83) (-3.16)
lagRAMW 0.30 0.26∗
(1.49) (1.71)
lagRAMW2 -0.09 -0.09∗∗
(-1.63) (-2.08)
AWP -0.02 -0.04∗ -0.03 -0.06∗∗∗
(-0.54) (-1.68) (-1.20) (-3.82)
H 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.94) (-0.05) (-0.89) (0.87)
GRR -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(-3.38) (-4.29) (-4.46) (-3.06)
EmpMid 1.59∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗
(5.07) (8.50) (5.39) (10.17)
Conscription -0.01 0.00 -0.01∗∗ 0.01
(-1.43) (0.79) (-2.46) (1.27)
Bargaining 0.01 -0.00 0.02∗ -0.01
(1.62) (-0.08) (1.76) (-0.91)
SchEn -0.00 -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.00
(-0.69) (-2.73) (-0.45) (-1.53)
PRY 0.28 -0.27 0.47 -0.02
(0.76) (-0.48) (1.02) (-0.03)
Recession 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.01
(0.69) (-0.95) (0.83) (-1.38)
Constant -1.35∗∗∗ -0.84∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗ -0.67∗
(-3.13) (-2.20) (-2.73) (-1.91)
FE YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES NO YES NO
Country Trend NO YES NO YES
Elasticity -0.04 -0.15 -0.00 -0.14
Elasticity S.E. (0.22) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)
Observations 228 228 228 228
K-P Wald F 130.02 57.44 144.45 77.57
Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at country level, z-
Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 2: Effects of minimum wages on prediction of employment – Kaitz Index
Figure 3: Effects of minimum wages on prediction of employment – Annual Wage
12
unemployment12, and have more outside options than prime-age workers (e.g. can stay longer in
education). Moreover, younger workers have higher probability of receiving a job offer than older
workers (Addison et al. 2004). Hence, an increase of the minimum wage makes employment more
attractive as in other age groups. Higher minimum wages increase the job acceptance probability,
resulting in a higher employment. This positive employment effect is counteracted by the negative
job offer effect, as firms facing increased costs for salaries will be no longer offer low productive
jobs. At low levels of minimum wage, the job acceptance effect dominates the job offer effect
resulting in a positive employment effect. We find that for the young age group the turning point
is on average attained for a real annual minimum wage of 15500$ (PPP) or respectively at a
Kaitz index of 0.400. At this threshold level an additional increase of the Kaitz index decreases
employment.
The average real minimum wage is in fact slightly above the turning point at a level of 15700$
(PPP). The same holds true for the Kaitz index which equals on average 0.405. On average, in
both specifications we would expect on a decrease in the employment rate if the minimum wage
variable increased, even despite the fact that for specific countries this might not hold true.
For all specifications, the estimated average elasticity of employment with respect to the min-
imum wage, equals between -0.00 and -0.15 depending on the specification and the elasticity of
employment to the changes in the Kaitz index is estimated at between -0.07 and -0.21. These
figures correspond to the previous results for young workers surveyed in Brown (1999). The study
indicates that the estimate the elasticity of youth employment with respect to the minimum wage13
between -0.07 and -0.41. It is important to note, however, that previous studies have estimated
a linear relationship, in which case, if the actual relationship is non–linear, the previous results
would be underestimated - the downward–sloping part of the inverted–U relationship would have
a higher negative slope, than suggested by the averaged estimates. Hence it is interesting to see
the development of average point elasticity of employment with respect to minimum wage changes
for different reference ranges over the average annual statutory minimum wage of 15700. Table 5
highlights the results that are in line with the ones indicated by the literature.
Table 5: Average point elasticity in the refrence ranges above the average annual staturory minimum wage
Reference range 1000USD 2000USD
Elasticity RAMW -0.070 -0.130
Elasticity MWAW -0.092 -0.155
4.2. Interaction of the minimum wages with other labor market characteristics
Table 6 presents the results of the interaction between the level of the minimum wage and
workers’ productivity, labor market regulations and unemployment replacement rates for the young
workforce. The effect of the interaction between average productivity and the minimum wage has
an expected positive sign in all specifications when the Kaitz index is used. In the specification
where the real annual minimum wage is used, the effect is positive and significant only when
time effects and country effects are used. If country time trends are included, the results are not
significant any more.
The effect of the interaction between labor market regulations and the minimum wage is in line
with theory and has the expected negative sign in all specifications. The results are significant no
matter which minimum wage variable is used. Only the real annual minimum wage and country
specific time trends are used, the coefficient turns insignificant.
12Cosar (2010): “lower discount rate, which makes them more willing to tolerate unemployment and search for
productive matches.”
13Neumark and Wascher (2004) estimate for OECD countries the elasticity of employment with respect to the
minimum wage of teenage workers (15-19 years old) between -0.18 to -0.24 and of youth workers between -0.13 to
-0.16. Similarly, OECD (1998) estimates the elasticities for teenage workers (15-19 years old) between -0.07 to -0.41
and for young adults (20-24 years old) between -0.03 to -0.1.
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Table 6: Young workers – interactions: Kaitz Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY
lagMWAW 1.37∗∗ 0.47 1.76∗∗∗ 1.13 ∗∗ 2.25∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗
(2.54) (1.60) (2.78) (2.45) (2.80) (3.29)
lagMWAW2 -1.77∗∗∗ -0.79∗∗ -2.18∗∗∗ -1.61∗∗∗ -2.81∗∗∗ -2.03∗∗∗
(-2.67) (-2.15) (-3.23) (-3.28) (-2.71) (-3.43)
AWP -0.09∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.02
(-2.71) (-4.33) (-0.43) (-2.87) (-0.36) (-1.15)
H 0.01 -0.04∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.00 -0.04∗
(0.91) (-2.39) (2.42) (1.93) (0.02) (-1.86)
GRR -0.03∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.02 -0.03∗∗ -0.07 -0.10
(-1.85) (-2.06) (-1.51) (-2.38) (-1.55) (-1.48)
lagMWAW × AWP 0.27∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(2.70) (3.07)
lagMWAW × H -0.26∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗
(-2.37) (-3.06)
lagMWAW × GRR 0.08 0.18
(0.71) (1.07)
EmpMid 1.60∗∗∗ 1.58∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗
(4.15) (9.39) (3.22) (8.21) (3.85) (8.86)
SchEn -0.00 -0.00∗∗ -0.00 -0.00∗∗ -0.00 -0.00∗
(-1.34) (-2.49) (-1.26) (-2.02) (-1.00) (-1.93)
PRY 0.07 -0.27 0.19 -0.04 0.38 -0.25
(0.19) (-0.67) (0.53) (-0.09) (0.91) (-0.54)
Conscription -0.00 -0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.01∗ -0.00 -0.02∗∗∗
(-0.05) (-3.36) (0.57) (-1.91) (-0.08) (-2.67)
Bargaining 0.02∗∗ -0.00 0.03∗∗∗ 0.00 0.02∗∗ 0.00
(2.24) (-0.11) (3.32) (0.58) (2.28) (0.11)
Recession 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00
(0.63) (-0.04) (0.05) (-0.87) (0.54) (-0.72)
Constant -1.04∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗ -0.99∗∗ -0.59∗∗∗ -1.33∗∗ -0.80∗∗∗
(-2.46) (-2.98) (-1.96) (-2.60) (-2.39) (-3.99)
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES NO YES NO YES NO
Country trends NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 228 228 228 228 228 228
K-P Wald 23.37 80.97 18.27 81.53 23.02 73.99
Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at country level, z-Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7: Young workers – interactions: Annual Minimum Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY
lagRAMW 0.37∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗
(4.85) (2.17) (4.75) (2.28) (4.64) (2.49)
lagRAMW2 -0.13∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗
(-5.72) (-3.20) (-5.58) (-3.20) (-5.25) (-3.51)
AWP -0.05∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.02∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.02∗
(-3.59) (-0.53) (-1.84) (-2.33) (-3.41) (-1.67)
H 0.01 -0.03∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.00 -0.04∗∗
(0.66) (-1.67) (3.93) (0.13) (-0.19) (-2.32)
GRR -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗ -0.04 -0.11∗∗∗
(-2.63) (-2.04) (-1.77) (-1.84) (-1.19) (-3.02)
lagMWAW × AWP 0.02∗∗∗ -0.00
(3.28) (-0.04)
lagMWAW × H -0.04∗∗∗ -0.02
(-4.52) (-1.61)
lagMWAW × GRR -0.01 0.05∗
(-0.50) (1.96)
EmpMid 1.30∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 1.58∗∗∗
(4.91) (10.62) (4.34) (10.25) (5.38) (13.78)
SchEn -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00∗
(-0.69) (-1.63) (-0.62) (-1.64) (-0.64) (-1.65)
PRY 0.52 0.07 0.40 0.13 0.64 0.21
(1.31) (0.14) (1.21) (0.25) (1.52) (0.41)
Conscription 0.00 -0.01∗ 0.01 -0.01∗ -0.00 -0.01∗
(0.10) (-1.68) (0.56) (-1.93) (-0.20) (-1.80)
Bargaining 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00
(4.10) (0.37) (4.52) (0.70) (2.68) (0.04)
Recession 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.73) (-0.40) (0.38) (-0.46) (0.52) (-0.15)
Constant -0.89∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗∗ -0.85∗∗∗ -0.64∗∗∗ -0.93∗∗∗ -0.86∗∗∗
(-3.39) (-3.16) (-3.01) (-2.96) (-3.89) (-3.57)
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES NO YES NO YES NO
Country trends NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 228 228 228 228 228 228
K-P Wald 24.29 78.50 20.56 83.80 19.27 88.74
Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at country level, z-Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Interaction with the replacement rates is mostly insignificant. It can be explained, as men-
tioned, by the fact that young workers are often not eligible for unemployment benefits.
Figure 4: Marginal effects of minimum wages at levels of H and AWP: Kaitz Index
Figure 5: Marginal effects of minimum wages at levels of H and AWP: Annual Minimum Wage
Marginal effects of the minimum wages for different values of AWP, and H are presented in
Figures 4 and 5. Inspection of Figure 4 reveals that the negative effect of the minimum wages
is particularly important when the average workers’ productivity is low, whereas once the pro-
ductivity increases the effect turns positive. This empirical finding is again consistent with the
theoretical prediction about the role of productivity on the job offers. From (1) it follows that
when a is high compared to the equilibrium wage, job offers might not be disappearing so easily.
Finally, Figure 4 reveals that the negative effect of the minimum wages on employment is particu-
larly relevant whenever the job market is strongly regulated, a result which is consistent with our
theoretical model but is not in line with the findings of Neumark and Wascher (2004). When the
overall regulation level is low, the additional effect of the minimum wage turns insignificant.
In Figures 6 and 7 we compare the predicted turning points for the young workforce with
the actual minimum wages for European countries, taking into account the joint effect of the
minimum wage and other labor market characteristics. The differences in the turning points for
the countries stem therefore from the impacts of the hiring costs, the workers’ productivity, and
the replacement rates. The observed increase in the turning point over time is mainly due to the
increase in productivity levels.
In four of the countries in our sample - Belgium, France, Greece, and Netherlands - the mini-
mum wages are higher than the upper limit of the 95 percent confidence interval for the turning
point. In Ireland, the minimum wage level is above the turning point but within the 95 percent
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Figure 6: Turning points and actual minimum wage for young workers (aged 15 to 24 years) I
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Figure 7: Turning points and actual Kaitz index for young workers (aged 15 to 24 years) II
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confidence interval. Decreasing the minimum wage in these countries is expected to increase the
employment levels of young workers. As the driving forces of these results, we can identify high re-
placement rates and strict job market regulations for the case of France and very low productivity
levels and strict job market regulations in Greece or simply because of a generally high level of the
minimum wage (e.g. in Belgium and the Netherlands). In other countries, either low replacement
rates (e.g. in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland), or otherwise deregulated job markets
(e.g. in the United Kingdom and Ireland) lead to higher turning points, and therefore suggest
that employment of young workers could be further stimulated with an increase in the minimum
wage. However, it is important to notice that for countries such as Spain or the UK, the actual
minimum wage is below the turning point but within the 95 percent confidence interval.
Especially in the Eastern European countries, there seems to be room for increasing the min-
imum wages without harming the employment of young workers, or potentially even stimulating
it. The same holds true for Portugal. For Spain there seems to be a possibility of increasing the
minimum wage, since the actual value is almost at the lower edge of the 95 percent interval. The
UK had almost the optimal minimum wage level in 2011. This indicates an increase as well as a
decrease of the minimum wage level would result in employment losses. In Ireland, the minimum
wage level is on the upper edge of the interval and therefore a further increase would lower the
employment rate of young workers. For Belgium, France, Greece, and Netherlands decreasing the
minimum wage would lead to higher employment rates of the young workforce.
Table 8 shows the optimal levels of the annual minimum wage (in 2010 US Dollars, PPP)
for all countries within the sample. The highest optimal minimum wages level can be found in
Ireland and in the UK, where it is above 20000$ (PPP). At the lower end, there is Greece and the
Czech Republic that have the predicted optimal minimum wage level of 13200$ (PPP) and 15800$
(PPP), respectively.
Table 8: Turning points 2011 (in 2010 PPP US Dollars)
Country LL 95% Turning point UL 95%
Belgium 15800 19000 21200
Czech Republic 15800 18000 19400
France 14600 17500 19400
Greece 13000 13100 13200
Hungary 15300 17200 18400
Ireland 16300 20400 23100
Netherlands 15200 18300 20400
Poland 15400 18200 20000
Portugal 14600 17600 19600
Slovakia 15400 18000 19700
Spain 14500 17200 19100
United Kingdom 16800 19400 21000
4.3. Robustness analysis
The first robustness check stems from weighting the countries by the sizes of their respective
labor markets. The size of the labor market is the number of persons of working age, thus aged
15 to 64. The results are presented in Table 13 in the Appendix. We find that weighting the
regressions does not change the main conclusions. The nonlinearity of the effect of the minimum
wage remains visible, although at slightly lower significance levels for the Kaitz index. Interestingly,
the results of the weighted regressions suggest that the effect of collective bargaining on the
employment is significant: it induces young employment and reduces older workforce participation.
Collective bargaining arrangements can in fact reduce employment rates of the older labor force,
by forcing the industries to employ them at rates higher than otherwise stemming from their
qualifications and equilibrium wages. Strict labor market regulations, on the other hand, induce
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higher employment levels for the older workers. The effect here can be most probably linked
to reduced possibilities of firing. In any case, these interesting preliminary observations require
further study.
Secondly, as mentioned in Section 3, one of the main methodological concerns in the analysis
of employment effects of minimum wages, is the potential endogeneity of the minimum wages.
Another issue concerns the use of weighted regressions to account for the sizes of the labor markets.
In this section, therefore, we compare the main results with those of the IV approach, in which
we instrument the minimum wages with the index of left orientation of the cabinets as well as
to the weighted regression approach. In Table 12 (in the Appendix) we show the results of the
main estimations, keeping everything else equal to the main specification, only with the variables
lagMWAW and lagMWAW2 (and respectively lagRMAW and lagRMAW2) instrumented with
the left orientation of the cabinet. The results for the Kaitz index specification remain the same,
whereas results for the annual minimum wage specification turn insignificant. The latter fact relies
mostly on the weakness of the instrument in this case, and the result should be interpreted with
caution.
We additionally show the relationship between the current minimum wage and employment
levels. We are convinced that the lagged specification corresponds better with the rigid European
labor markets, yet to analyze sensitivity of the results to this somehow arbitrary assumption, we
present in Table 14 in the Appendix the current specification. Coefficients and standard errors
remain similar, the evaluated elasticities have slighly lower values on the average.
Finally, since the sample size is relatively small, we need to make sure that the results are not
driven by outliers. We reestimate all equations correcting for outliers. We identify the outliers on
a basis of the leverage statistic and the Cook distance. The leverage need to be lower than 3k/N '
0.73 and the Cook’s distance needs to be lower than 4/N ' 0.018. We drop the obversations which
do not satisfy these requirements and resasses the results. None of the main conclusions remains
affected by this change.
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5. Concluding Remarks
The goal of this paper was to estimate the sensitivity of employment to changes in minimum
wages for young workers. The paper was inspired by the theoretical model of Brown et al. (2014),
which suggests that the employment effects of a minimum wage are positive if the minimum wage
is sufficiently low.
Our results contribute to the discussion of the effects of minimum wages on employment,
which have been reported in previous studies to have a detrimental effect, in particular for the
young workforce. The presented results suggest that low levels of minimum wage have in fact a
positive effect, as they stimulate job acceptance rates. On the other hand, high minimum wages
decrease the demand for labor and destroy employment possibilities. Moreover, we show that the
minimum wage effect is conditional on other labor markets’ characteristics, in particular on the
levels of workers productivity and labor market regulations. Detrimental effects of high minimum
wages are particularly strong if accompanied by low productivity and/or comparatively strict labor
market regulations.
Our results highlight the fact, that some previous estimates of the elasticity of employment with
respect to the minimum wages must be considered with caution. Barely negative or insignificant
results come as a result of averaging the estimates over two groups of countries: with comparatively
low minimum wages for which we expect positive employment effects of an increase in the minimum
wage, and those with high minimum wages. The employment effects differ substantially between
these two groups, and a simple averaged elasticity cannot fully capture these effects.
Using these results, we are able to show that some European countries in our sample might in
fact contribute to unemployment rates of young individuals by setting too high levels of minimum
wages, as is the case in Belgium, France, Greece, and Netherlands.
However, in Spain, the UK and Ireland, the actual minimum wage is very close to the turning
point, suggesting that a further increase in the minimum wage could reduce the employment rates
of the young workforce. On the other hand, in countries which either have relatively deregulated
job markets and/or highly productive workers, higher minimum wages should not have a detri-
mental effect on employment. Especially in the Eastern European countries, there seems to be
room for increasing the minimum wages without harming the employment of young workers, or
potentially even stimulating it. The same holds true for Portugal, while for Spain there seems
to be no (or only a small) possibility of increasing the minimum wage. The UK had almost the
optimal minimum wage level in 2011. This indicates an increase as well as a decrease of the
minimum wage level would result in employment losses. As a general recommendation, it can be
concluded that policy makers should formulate the minimum wage policy in accordance with local
circumstances, and in particular closely considering the characteristics of the local labor markets.
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Appendix
Figure 8: Relationship between average and minimum wages: country by country
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics of the Kaitz index and Real Annual Minimum Wage (in 10000 PPP US Dollars)
Country Variable Mean SD Min Max
Belgium Kaitz index 0.47 0.02 0.43 0.49
(1983) Minimum Wage 2.16 0.06 2.01 2.28
Czech Republic Kaitz Index 0.28 0.05 0.20 0.34
(1993) Minimum Wage 0.61 0.18 0.35 0.84
Estonia Kaitz Index 0.30 0.03 0.26 0.34
(1999) Minimum Wage 0.49 0.15 0.27 0.68
France Kaitz Index 0.44 0.03 0.37 0.48
(1983) Minimum Wage 1.79 0.16 1.44 2.06
Greece Kaitz Index 0.40 0.06 0.31 0.49
(1983) Minimum Wage 1.26 0.10 1.13 1.45
Hungary Kaitz Index 0.34 0.04 0.28 0.42
(1992) Minimum Wage 0.60 0.15 0.41 0.79
Ireland Kaitz Index 0.44 0.01 0.43 0.46
(2001) Minimum Wage 2.04 0.16 1.83 2.25
Netherlands Kaitz Index 0.48 0.06 0.41 0.59
(1971) Minimum Wage 2.42 0.14 2.25 2.81
Poland Kaitz Index 0.35 0.06 0.14 0.43
(1992) Minimum Wage 0.66 0.17 0.43 0.95
Portugal Kaitz Index 0.38 0.03 0.34 0.42
(1975) Minimum Wage 1.00 0.08 0.85 1.21
Slovakia Kaitz Index 0.35 0.05 0.27 0.48
(1994) Minimum Wage 0.61 0.11 0.47 0.80
Slowenia Kaitz Index 0.43 0.03 0.40 0.47
(2005) Minimum Wage 1.15 0.18 0.90 1.55
Spain Kaitz Index 0.37 0.03 0.33 0.45
(1972) Minimum Wage 1.30 0.06 1.20 1.41
United Kingdom Kaitz Index 0.36 0.02 0.33 0.38
(1999) Minimum Wage 1.78 0.17 1.46 1.95
Total Kaitz Index 0.39 0.07 0.14 0.59
Minimum Wage 1.34 0.64 0.27 2.81
Table 10: Description of the explanatory and instumental variables
PRY Cohort size aged 15–24 (OECD)
EmpMid Employment rate of workers aged 25–54 (OECD)
Output Gap Output gap in percent of potential GDP (WEO)
Oil Price Crude oil import prices (IEA)
GRR Gross replacement rates (OECD)
AWP GDP per hours worked, constant prices (OECD)
H Labor market regulations EFW B (higher value - more regulation)
SchEn Gross Secondary School Enrollment (UN)
Conscription World Survey of Conscription and Conscientious Objection to Military Service,
EFW Index
Bargaining Global Competitiveness Report question: Wages in your country are set by a
centralized bargaining process (= 1) or up to each individual company (= 7)
Left2 Relative power position of social democratic and other left parties in government
based on their seat share in parliament (CPDS I and III)
Recession Equals 1 in periods with negative growth of real GDP (WEO)
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Table 12: Main results: IV with left orientation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY
lagMWAW 15.63∗∗ 16.21∗
(2.08) (1.78)
lagMWAW2 -20.71∗∗∗ -22.74∗
(-2.59) (-1.75)
lagRAMW 1.43 2.40
(0.47) (1.42)
lagRAMW2 -0.42 -0.77
(0.03) (-1.60)
AWP -0.06 -0.04 0.07 -0.11∗∗
(-0.71) (-0.68) (0.26) (-1.98)
H 0.12∗ -0.02 0.06 -0.05∗∗
(1.94) (-0.36) (0.95) (-2.33)
GRR 0.07 -0.13∗ -0.02 -0.11∗∗
(1.10) (-1.95) (-0.37) (-2.28)
Conscription 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.03
(0.80) (0.96) (1.26) (0.85)
Bargaining 0.08 0.02∗∗ 0.05 0.02
(1.29) (2.15) (1.63) (1.09)
SchEn 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(1.01) (-1.06) (1.18) (-0.41)
PRY 3.18 1.10 3.04 3.95∗
(1.36) (0.66) (1.42) (1.78)
Recession 0.04∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.06 0.02
(2.43) (1.70) (1.27) (0.92)
EmpMid 1.01 1.13∗∗∗ 0.41 1.48∗∗∗
(0.85) (4.42) (0.52) (7.97)
Constant -3.75∗ -3.38∗ 1.79 -3.47∗
(-1.66) (-1.80) (0.54) (-1.78)
FE YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES NO YES NO
Country Trend NO YES NO YES
Elasticity -0.05 -0.20 -0.03 -0.15
Elasticity S.E. 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.18
Observations 228 228 228 228
K-P Wald F 0.62 3.07 0.60 2.15
Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at country level, z-
Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 13: Main results: weighted regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY
lagMWAW 1.94∗ 1.91∗∗
(1.86) (2.05)
lagMWAW 2 -2.41∗ -2.64∗∗
(-1.90) (-2.11)
lagRAMW 0.35∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(2.61) (3.93)
lagRAMW2 -0.12∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(-3.07) (-4.94)
AWP 0.01 -0.00 -0.03∗ -0.02∗
(0.44) (-0.39) (-1.90) (-1.69)
H -0.01 -0.05∗∗ -0.01 -0.05∗∗
(-0.91) (-2.34) (-1.07) (-2.26)
GRR -0.03∗ -0.03∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗
(-1.87) (-1.77) (-4.04) (-2.01)
EmpMid 1.55∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗
(6.06) (11.81) (6.22) (14.17)
PRY 0.39 -0.04 0.96∗∗∗ 0.43
(1.19) (-0.12) (2.85) (0.96)
SchEn -0.00 -0.00∗∗ -0.00 -0.00∗
(-0.80) (-2.02) (-0.52) (-1.66)
Conscription -0.01 -0.02∗ -0.00 -0.01
(-1.45) (-1.91) (-0.60) (-1.44)
Bargaining 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(4.04) (1.92) (4.39) (2.08)
Recession 0.00 0.00 0.01∗ 0.00
(0.78) (0.42) (1.70) (0.28)
Constant -1.26∗∗∗ -0.76∗∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗ -0.83∗∗∗
(-3.70) (-3.01) (-5.74) (-4.64)
FE YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES NO YES NO
Country Trend NO YES NO YES
Elasticity -0.05 -0.30 -0.08 -0.03
Elasticity S.E. 0.10 0.23 0.09 0.16
Observations 228 228 228 228
K-P Wald F 18.36 45.14 21.19 53.59
Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at country level, z-
Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 14: Main results: current specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY
MWAW 1.86∗∗ 2.32∗∗∗
(2.44) (3.26)
MWAW2 -2.29∗∗ -3.30∗∗∗
(-2.46) (-3.75)
RAMW 0.35∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗
(2.93) (2.11)
RAMW2 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
(-2.94) (-2.90)
AWP -0.01 -0.02 -0.03∗∗ -0.02∗
(-0.70) (-1.16) (-2.57) (-1.68)
H 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03∗
(0.54) (-1.63) (-0.63) (-1.80)
GRR -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.02
(-4.01) (-3.09) (-3.99) (-1.59)
EmpMid 1.47∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗
(4.94) (9.03) (5.67) (11.72)
Conscription 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01∗
(0.24) (-1.51) (-0.47) (-1.72)
Bargaining 0.02∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗ 0.00
(1.67) (1.22) (2.31) (0.17)
SchEn -0.00 -0.00∗∗ -0.00 -0.00∗
(-1.21) (-2.19) (-0.76) (-1.75)
PRY 0.31 -0.26 0.55 0.00
(0.76) (-0.63) (1.31) (0.00)
Recession 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00
(0.14) (-0.36) (1.13) (-0.33)
Constant -1.10∗∗∗ -0.77∗∗∗ -0.99∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗∗
(-3.21) (-2.98) (-4.61) (-2.91)
FE YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES NO YES NO
Country Trend NO YES NO YES
Elasticity -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
Elasticity S.E. 0.17 0.20 0.13 0.14
Observations 231 231 231 231
K-P Wald F 18.36 45.14 21.19 53.59
Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at country level, z-
Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 15: Main results: outlier correction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EmpY EmpY EmpY EmpY
lagMWAW 2.06∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗
(2.99) (3.03)
lagMWAW2 -2.69∗∗∗ -2.46∗∗∗
(-3.27) (-3.47)
lagRAMW 0.40∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(7.24) (3.29)
lagRAMW2 -0.13∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(-7.53) (-4.20)
AWP 0.00 -0.01 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01
(0.40) (-0.75) (-4.06) (-1.39)
H 0.01 -0.03∗ -0.00 -0.03∗∗
(0.73) (-1.80) (-0.26) (-2.15)
GRR -0.02∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(-2.92) (-3.58) (-7.39) (-4.68)
EmpMid 1.71∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 1.71∗∗∗
(6.28) (8.03) (14.24) (9.83)
PRY 0.61∗∗ 0.20 1.03∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗
(2.19) (0.95) (3.54) (2.28)
SchEn 0.00 -0.00∗∗ 0.00 -0.00∗
(0.09) (-2.19) (0.24) (-1.72)
Conscription 0.00 -0.01∗∗ -0.00 -0.01
(0.06) (-2.26) (-0.31) (-1.34)
Bargaining 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01
(3.27) (1.04) (3.83) (1.05)
Recession 0.01∗ 0.00 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00
(1.73) (0.55) (3.36) (0.74)
Constant -1.42∗∗∗ -0.88∗∗∗ -1.27∗∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗
(-4.18) (-3.96) (-10.39) (-5.91)
FE YES YES YES YES
Time effects YES NO YES NO
Country Trend NO YES NO YES
Elasticity -0.16 -0.43 0.05 -0.03
Elasticity S.E. 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.11
Observations 202 195 201 201
K-P Wald F 18.36 45.14 21.19 53.59
Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at country level, z-
Stats in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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